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PAYING FOR FREE SPEECH: THE CONTINUING
VALIDITY OF COX v. NEW HAMPSHIRE
In Cox v. New Hampshire, I the Supreme Court rejected a first amend-
ment challenge to a licensing statute that imposed a fee on groups hold-
ing "parades or processions." 2  Since this landmark decision, local
governments' power to require public demonstrators to procure permits
and pay fees to offset the costs of their demonstrations has remained
largely unchallenged.3 Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh,4 invali-
dated a "police protection ordinance" 5 that imposed permit fees based on
the estimated costs of providing police protection during demonstrations.
This holding substantially narrows the rule of Cox v. New Hampshire and
threatens the validity of police protection ordinances.
This Note examines the continued validity and desirability of police
protection ordinances. Part I discusses the fundamental role of free
speech in American society. Part II explains the function of police pro-
tection in public demonstrations, the costs associated with that protec-
tion, and the positive effect of police protection on the exercise of free
speech. Part III examines Supreme Court treatment of government re-
strictions on the exercise of free speech. Finally, Part IV rejects the Cen-
tral Florida approach to police protection ordinances and concludes that
police protection ordinances imposing a fee based on actual costs are
constitutionally valid and socially desirable.
I. THE ROLE OF FREE SPEECH
The first amendment's guarantee of free speech serves as a cornerstone
1. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
2. N.H. P.L ch. 145, § 4 (current version at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286:4 (1977)). For the
text of this statute, see infra note 39.
3. See Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators Be Re-
quired to Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums?, 62 TEx. L. REV. 403 (1983). Permit
applicants have challenged other aspects of licensing ordinances. See, eg., Shuttleworth v. City of
Burmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (prohibiting unbridled discretion to grant or deny permits);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallendale, 734 F.2d 666 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (ordinance must
contain procedural safeguards to avoid abuse).
4. 774 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1637 (1986).
5. As used in this Note, "police protection ordinance" refers to a licensing ordinance that
charge, a fee based on the actual or estimated cost to the city of providing police protection.
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of personal and political development in the United States. 6 The Ameri-
can political system operates on the premise that rational voters, permit-
ted to choose among the widest possible range of competing ideas, will
arrive at socially superior decisions. Democratic principles and free
speech create a "marketplace" of competing political ideas.7 Individuals
cast ideas into the market where they compete with other ideas for voter
consideration.8 Voters choose between these competing ideas and ex-
press their choices through the ballot.
Ideas can only enter the marketplace if individuals gain access to pub-
lic forums in order to express their political and social views. When a
broad range of speakers has access to public forums, the market will re-
flect a wide range of views. However, all speakers cannot gain access to
all forums. For example, many speakers cannot afford television or radio
broadcasting time, and speakers espousing unconventional views may
find the mass media unreceptive. For this reason, public streets and
parks, which are accessible to speakers regardless of their financial re-
sources or media appeal, are vitally important public forums.9 Maintain-
ing free access to public streets and parks helps insure a market
composed of a wide range of competing ideas.10
6. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723
F.2d 1050, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983) ("right to communicate freely ... is a cornerstone of our American
polity"); Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1304 (1 lth Cir. 1983) ("speech goes to the
heart of our democratic process"). See also Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 23 (1975) (first amendment advances self-government, aids in
the search for truth, and promotes the "sense of individual self-worth").
7. The marketplace of ideas theory tracks the theory of free market economics. Much like
produced goods, ideas compete in the market for acceptance by buyers/voters seeking to satisfy
personal interests. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Holmes stated that "the
best test of truth is in the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Commentators recognize this statement as introducing the mar-
ketplace concept into first amendment legal thought. See Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legit-
imizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3.
8. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 3 (marketplace theory "assumes that a process of robust debate,
if uninhibited by government interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best
perspectives or solutions for societal problems").
9. The Supreme Court has characterized streets and parks as "quintessential public forums."
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Such forums have
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
10. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 42. Ingber noted that Vietnam war protestors used public
forums to challenge the views of the "status quo," including the views of public officials possessing
access to mass media. Id. at 42 n.208. Similarly, the civil rights movement gained national attention
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II. FREE SPEECH AND POLICE PROTECTION
A. Public Order and Free Speech
Although vitally important to the effective functioning of the Ameri-
can political process, public demonstrations, unlike other forms of ex-
pression, present unique problems. Public demonstrators frequently rely
on the intensity of personal encounters for effective communication,
but personal confrontation also creates a potential for violence. 2 Vio-
lence, in turn, threatens public order and safety. Moreover, violence may
disrupt the flow of communication and garble the message that specta-
tors receive. As a result, important ideas may fail to reach receptive lis-
teners. In short, violence causes a breakdown in the proper functioning
of the marketplace of ideas and lessens the ability of voters to make in-
formed choices. 3
The likelihood that violence will occur during a demonstration de-
pends on two factors, the content of the speaker's message and the physi-
cal intrusion inherent in personal encounters. A public speaker cannot
avoid the risk of violence that results from the content of his message.
On the contrary, in Terminiello v. Chicago, 4 the Supreme Court noted
that speech should be encouraged when it causes people to consider pres-
ent conditions, "or even stirs people to anger."' 5 Demonstrators can re-
through effective use of public forums. Goldberger, supra note 3, at 403. See also Baker, Unrea-
soned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78
Nw. U.L. REV. 937, 944 (1983) ("streets sometimes are the only 'media' available to poor groups").
11. Mass media speakers disseminate their views to a wide audience. Public demonstrators,
however, can produce a greater effect in a smaller audience. "The audience's experience in a face-to-
face encounter is more imposing .... The interchange is more flexible, more of the senses are
engaged, and the audience's response ... is likely to be more pronounced." Ingber, supra note 7, at
41. See also G. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 55 (2d ed. 1981)
(demonstators "collar" their audience).
12. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 41. ("The emotional feedback generated by face-to-face contact
designed to evoke or increase support also may build antagonism and lead to violence.").
13. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion,
noted that freedom of speech holds no value if a hostile audience can silence the speaker. Id. at 31.
The marketplace of ideas contains flaws similar to those found in economic markets. Speech consis-
tent with the dominating ideology in the society gains ready market acceptance, while unconven-
tional views are ignored. The market, therefore, contains a "skew" in favor of conventional views.
Ingber, supra note 7, at 16-17. Violent spectators disrupt a speaker's message and thereby exacerbate
this skew. See generally Barnum, Freedom of Assembly and the Hostile Audience in Anglo-American
Law. 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 59 (1981) (discussing hostile audience and first amendment rights); Note,
Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 489 (1951).
14. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
15. Id. at 4.
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duce the risk of violence caused by the physical intrusion of the
demonstration if they travel less congested routes or split into smaller
groups. These measures, however, reduce the size of the speaker's audi-
ence and diminish the persuasive effect of his message.' 6
Courts have stressed the vital relationship between public order and
free speech. In Cox v. New Hampshire,17 for example, the Supreme
Court stated that civil liberties "imply the existence of an organized soci-
ety maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in
the excesses of unrestrained abuses.""8 Justice Jackson, in a dissenting
opinion in Terminiello, also noted that the maintenance of public order is
necessary "if free speech is to be a practical reality."' 9 Finally, in Hous-
ton Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council,20 the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas stressed the importance of "safeguarding [the]
good order upon which ... civil liberties ultimately depend." 2'
B. The Role of Police Protection
Police protection during demonstrations, unlike private measures to
reduce the likelihood of violence, serves as an effective means of main-
taining public order.22 Law enforcement officials possess the authority
and training to control spectators angered by the message content. Po-
lice control over vehicle and pedestrian flow also reduces the physically
intrusive nature of demonstrations. Finally, the mere presence of police
officers may deter spectators from interfering with controversial
speakers.
Although effective and beneficial, police protection imposes costs upon
the public. A city can hire additional police officers or reassign officers
16. In the absence of spectators, even the most exciting demonstration lacks force. In addition,
by reducing the number of participants or spectators, a speaker forfeits other advantages of size. A
mass demonstration "conveys an image of power to bystanders and participants alike, reinforces the
group's commitment to its cause,... and appears to circumvent the elite's power to control mass
communication." Ingber, supra note 7, at 41.
17. 312 U.S. 563 (1941).
18. Id. at 574.
19. 337 U.S. at 31 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
20. 310 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The Houston ordinance required demonstrators to
procure liability insurance prior to the issuance of a parade permit. See infra note 37 for a discussion
of insurance permits.
21. 310 F. Supp. at 459.
22. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 31 (1949) (free speech "depends on local police...
who, regardless of their own feelings, risk themselves to maintain supremacy of law") (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 64:985
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from its existing force to maintain public order during a demonstration.
Employing additional officers imposes a significant pecuniary burden,
2 3
and drawing officers from existing duties necessarily diminishes police
protection in other areas.24 In order to fund adequate protection, munic-
ipalities may have to forego other important social objectives. Public
demonstrations thus create a conflict between the need to protect free
speech and allocate limited public resources.25
III. RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH
a. Supreme Court Protections
The marketplace of ideas theory tolerates only minor interference with
the free flow of information into the market. Restrictions which deny
speakers access to public forums or prevent the entry of ideas to the mar-
ketplace interfere with the voter's ability to make rational decisions.26
Government regulation, therefore, must facilitate rather than impede the
free flow of ideas by correcting malfunctions that may develop in the
marketplace.27
In evaluating government regulation, the Supreme Court has tradition-
ally distinguished "content-based" restrictions from "content-neutral"
23. See House COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 1980 FISCAL YEAR SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRI-
ATIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 623 (April 22, 1980) (District expended $86,800 to police
the Iranian student demonstration during the peak to the "hostage crisis"). A city may employ off
duty officers, usually at an overtime pay rate. Instead, a city may hire reserve officers at lower pay.
See Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (1lth Cir. 1985). However,
reserve officers, generally "doctors, lawyers and businessmen," id. at 1526 n.9, may lack the training
and qualifications necessary for effective performance during a demonstration.
24. See Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1527 (1980). Other
serious social consequences may result from reassignment. Blasi notes that frequent assignment to a
demonstration can cause resentment and vindictiveness in a police officer. Id. Moreover, demon-
strators can hold a city's resources hostage until the city gives in to the demonstrator's demands. In
effect, this amounts to a demand for "political ransom." Id. at 1528.
25. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). Government's options are limited. It can-
not punish or prohibit speech unless "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Id. at 4. But cf.
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (principle does not extend to inciting a riot).
26. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
27. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (restriction found to "conserve rather
than impair" free speech); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (government possesses
only limited power to regulate free speech in the public forum). See also R. LADENSON, A PHILOSO-
PHY OF FREE EXPRESSION AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATIONS 34 (1983) ("Unregulated ex-
pression of attitudes and beliefs occasionally leads to serious trouble. Total regulation, by contrast,
virtually guarantees it.").
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restrictions. 2  Content-based restrictions focus on the subject matter of
the speech in question and limit or prohibit speech about certain sub-
jects. 29 The court closely scrutinizes such restrictions because they can
effectively prevent all ideas about the restricted topic from reaching the
marketplace.30 Content-neutral restrictions control only the incidental
aspects of speech-the "time, place and manner" in which the message
reaches the market.31
The Supreme Court evaluates content-neutral restrictions under a level
of scrutiny which varies with the nature of the forum. The Court applies
a low scrutiny level to restrictions on access to nonpublic forums such as
school mailboxes32 and military bases. 33 The Court more closely scruti-
nizes access restrictions to semi-public forums such as state universities 34
and municipal theatres. 35 Finally, the Court strictly scrutinizes regula-
tions limiting access to public forums. To survive strict scrutiny, such
regulations must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and [must] leave open ample alternative channels of
communication."36
28. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to -3 (1978). See also Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). But see Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (arguing that the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions is unworkable and should be abolished).
29. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at § 12-2 (such restrictions are "aimed at communicative
impact"). See, eg., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 85 (1973) (law prohibiting obscene speech); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (law prohibiting the advocacy of violent overthrow of the
government).
30. To enforce a content-based restriction, the state must show "that its regulation is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educa-
tors' Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1984).
31. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at § 12-2 (such restrictions are "aimed at noncommunicative
impact" but may have adverse effects on "communicative opportunity"). Examples include laws
restricting noisy speech near hospitals, limiting signs in residential areas, and requiring individuals
distributing leaflets to disclose their names. Stone, supra note 28, at 81.
32. Perry Educators' Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S 37 (1983).
33. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (prohibition on political meetings and the distribu-
tion of literature upheld).
34. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university could limit campus forum to
student use only).
35. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theatre re-
fused to allow a performance of a controversial musical).
36. Perry Educators' Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/13
Number 3] PAYING FOR FREE SPEECH
B. Police Protection Ordinances
In order to defray the costs to the public of demonstrations, many
municipalities impose access restrictions in the form of licensing require-
ments on persons intending to conduct public parades, processions or
meetings. Such ordinances often require demonstrators to pay a fee
based on the actual or anticipated costs of providing the necessary police
protection. 7 In effect, police protection ordinances shift the burden of
providing additional police protection to those responsible for creating
the need.
In Cox v. New Hampshire,38 the Supreme Court upheld a police pro-
tection statute in the face of first amendment challenge. The statute au-
thorized a municipal licensing board to impose a license fee of "not more
than three hundred dollars."39 The Court found that the legislature au-
thorized the fee to cover only the administrative expenses and costs of
maintaining public order." The Court noted that the flat fee proposed
by the regulation's challengers "fail[ed] to take account of the difficulty
of framing a fair schedule to meet all circumstances."41 In addition, the
Court observed that adjustable fees allow local governments "that flexi-
bility ... which in the light of varying conditions would tend to conserve
rather than impair the liberty sought."'42
37. See, e.g., SEASIDE, CAL., CODE § 9-108 which provides:
(b) Exceptions-Parades or civil demonstrations which obstruct the free use of the public
streets and/or sidewalks may be permitted providing the following conditions are met: ...
(5) .. In the even that the anticipated crowds.., will reasonably require the use of extra
police officers... the cost of hiring such persons shall be at the expense of the person or
group applying for the permit.
(cited in Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal.3d 860, 863 n.2, 94 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778 n.2, 484 P.2d 945,
946 n.2 (1971)). See also infra notes 39 and 49.
Insurance ordinances allow a city to shift the burden of paying for damage to the permit applicant.
See, e.g., HousrON, TEx., CODE art. 8, § 48-208 (applicant required to deliver a "comprehensive
general liability insurance policy" prior to issuance of a license). This ordinance was invalidated in
Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Such ordi-
nances are remedial and do not aid in the mainstream of public order. See generally Note, Condi-
tioning Access to the Public Forum on the Purchase of Insurance, 17 GA. L. REv. 815 (1983).
38. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
39. Id. at 571-72 n.l. The New Hampshire statute authorized a municipality to establish a
licensing board. The statute further provided:
"Licenses: Fees: ... Every licensee shall pay in advance for such license, for the use of the
city or town, a sum note more than three hundred dollars for each day ... such parade,
procession or open-air meeting shall take place..I.." Id. (citing N.H. P.L. ch. 145 § 4).
40. 312 U.S. at 577.
41. Id.
42. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
992 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Despite the Court's holding in Cox, critics argue that police protection
ordinances force demonstrators to pay for the public benefits resulting
from free speech activity43 and erect economic barriers which discourage
speakers from entering the market.' Such critics, however, fail to recog-
nize offsetting factors which justify imposing demonstration costs on
those creating the need.
Free speech benefits society,45 but society should not bear the total cost
of free speech activity.46 Police protection ordinances may discourage
demonstrators from provoking excesses, such as violence, which provide
no corresponding social benefit.47 Additional cost, for example, deters
demonstrators from unnecessarily increasing the size of the demonstra-
tion. Although police protection ordinances may force speakers to
restructure their methods of presentation, such ordinances do not fore-
close access to public forums. In addition, police protection ordinances
recognize that speakers should pay for the benefits that they derive from
their activity, such as the opportunity to cultivate and express personal
ideas.48
IV. CENTRAL FLORIDA NUCLEAR FREEZE CAMPAIGN V. WALSH
In Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh,4 9 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an Orlando police protection ordi-
nance violated the first amendment. The ordinance required the chief of
police to anticipate the cost of additional police protection based on the
"size, location and nature of the assembly."5 The ordinance further re-
43. See Goldberger, supra note 3, at 411. Goldberger notes that cities provide police protection
and city maintenance services to others at no charge. He argues that charging speakers devalues
speech activity and places an inequitable burden on speakers. Id. See also Baker, supra note 10, at
1001.
44. See Goldberger, supra note 3, at 412.
45. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
46. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 1529 ("it cannot be said that society has a positive stake in the
maximum assertion of the right to demonstrate").
47. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
48. Free speech serves the "libertarian" value of allowing an individual to "develop ideas and to
express himself." Farber & Nowack, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1224 n. 30 (1984). See also Karst,
supra note 6, at 23 (free speech promotes "sense of individual self-worth"). See generally L. TmE,
supra note 28, at § 12-1 (discussing the purposes of freedom of speech).
49. 774 F.2d 1515 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1637 (1986).
50. The ordinance prohibited any "outdoor public assembly unless an outdoor public assembly
permit shall first have been obtained by the Chief of Police." Id. at 1516 n. 1 (citing ORLANDO, FLA.,
CODE § 18A.10(l)). The ordinance further provided:
[Vol. 64:985
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quired the applicant to prepay this anticipated expense. An anti-nuclear
organization challenged the fee as an "insurmountable burden" on free-
dom of speech.51
The Central Florida court interpreted Cox as allowing a municipality
to charge only "nominal" permit fees.52 The court ruled that Orlando's
ordinance, which placed the fee amount within the police chief's discre-
tion, violated this requirement. 53 The court noted that those persons un-
able to afford the anticipated costs would be denied an opportunity to be
heard.54 Finally, the court labeled the Orlando ordinance content-based
and held it invalid under the first amendment because the ordinance per-
mitted differential cost assessment based on the possibility of a hostile
response to the speaker's message. 55
In a concurring opinion, Judge Henderson chastised the majority for
improperly narrowing the Cox holding.56 According to Judge Hender-
son, Cox held that reasonable fees are constitutional if they are incidental
to maintaining public order.57 Judge Henderson found the Orlando ordi-
nance invalid, however, because it failed to provide an adequate constitu-
tional standard to prevent abuse of discretion."
The Central Florida court's narrow reading of Cox threatens to lead to
several undesirable consequences. First, Central Florida requires courts
to second-guess a city's determination of the means necessary to ensure
adequate police protection.5 9 License applicants can challenge the city's
"[The Chief of Police] shall determine whether and to what extent additional police protec-
tion reasonably will be required for the assembly for purposes of traffic and crowd control.
In making this determination, the chief of police shall consider such factors as the size,
location and nature of the assembly.... The applicant then shall have the duty to secure
police protection reasonably acceptable to the chief of police at the sole expense of the
applicant and shall prepay the expenses of such protection."
Id. at 1516 n.2 (citing ORLANDO, FLA., CODE § 18A.12).
51. Id. at 1518.
52. Id. at 1523.
53. Id. The court found that the ordinance's grant of discretion to the chief of police did not
require him to consider the purpose of the speech or the ability of the applicant to pay.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1524.
56, Id. at 1527 ("The majority misreads Cox v. New Hampshire... as permitting only nominal
charges for policing a demonstration in a public area.") (Henderson, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id. Judge Henderson concluded that the discretionary authority vested in the chief of po-
lice to determine the amount of police protection "reasonably required, failed to provide a constitu-
tionally adequate guarantee against an abuse of discretion.
59. In another context the Supreme Court has rejected such second-guessing. See Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). The Court upheld a National Park
Number 3]
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choice of means on the basis that they impose more than a nominal
charge. Presumably, local authorities possess greater capacity than
courts to determine the quantity and quality of police protection neces-
sary. In addition, local governments may choose to provide inadequate
police protection, thus sacrificing public order and effective communica-
tion in order to avoid court battles."
Second, the Central Florida approach forces municipalities to subsi-
dize the cost of demonstrations that impose costs in excess of amounts
considered nominal.6" Society will be forced to forego other positive
goals in order to subsidize free speech.
In addition, the Central Florida decision completely prohibits a city
from considering speech content when setting an appropriate fee.62 The
court incorrectly labeled the police protection ordinance' a content-based
restriction.63 This characterization ignores the fact that cities enact such
ordinances in order to recoup the actual costs of demonstrations not to
prohibit speech on certain topics."4 Although police protection ordi-
nances may impose greater costs on speakers espousing controversial
views, they only do so because such speakers need more police protec-
tion.61 Increased police protection increases the actual cost of the dem-
onstration. Police protection ordinances merely allow authorities to
consider speech content as one factor affecting actual cost; they do not
impermissibly discriminate on the basis of content.
Finally, as Judge Henderson correctly noted in his concurring opinion,
content-based restrictions, although subject to close judicial scrutiny, are
not invalid per se.6 6 Therefore, even if the majority correctly classified
the ordinance as content-based, this labeling should not have resulted in
immediate invalidation. The Supreme Court requires content-based re-
Service regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks in the face of a first amendment challenge.
The Court stated that its prior decisions concerning content-neutral restrictions do not "assign to the
judiciary the authority... or endow the judiciary with competence to judge how much protection of
park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained." Id. at 299.
60. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. See also Goldberger, supra note 3, at 415-16
n.65 (nominal charges are insufficient to cover the costs of a mass demonstration).
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. See also Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Cam-
paign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (Henderson, J., concurring).
64. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 11-16, 22 and accompanying text.
66. Central Fla., 774 F.2d at 1528 (Henderson, J., concurring).
[Vol. 64:985
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strictions to be justified by a compelling state interest,67 and police pro-
tection ordinances, which ensure the funds necessary to maintain public
order and permit effective communication, certainly promote compelling
state interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Adequate police protection during demonstrations ensures the public
order necessary for public safety and effective communication. Police
protection ordinances enable local governments to defray the costs of po-
licing public demonstrations and discourage excesses that increase the
costs of public speech without a corresponding public benefit. In addi-
tion, such ordinances allow cities to fund equally important social
projects rather than subsidize free speech activity. The Central Florida
court's narrow reading of Cox v. New Hampshire threatens the continued
viability of police protection ordinances and thereby hampers the exer-
cise of free speech.
Gary Wiseman
67. Central Fla., 774 F.2d at 1528 (Henderson, J., concurring). See supra note 30.
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